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ABSTRACT 
 
 
This paper is aimed at highlighting how common law has evolved over the centuries, namely through                
the flexibility accorded to judicial precedents, as well as through the evolutionary nature evidenced in               
the processes and rules applied in statutory interpretation. In addition to illustrating how informational              
asymmetries can be mitigated through decentralisation, the paper also illustrates how a particular case,              
Pepper v Hart has revolutionised the scope and permissibility of aids to statutory interpretation.              
Whilst the decision in the case has been criticised as having facilitated a transfer of powers from the                  
executive and legislature, to the judiciary, it is also evident that any form of aid to statutory                 
interpretation - which would greatly assist judges in arriving at reasonable outcomes - in terms of                
legitimate expectations and efficient allocation of economic resources, should be permitted in judicial             
proceedings.  
 
Whilst financial markets and changes in the environment impact legislators, and whilst it is widely               
accepted that legislation constitutes the supreme form of law, the necessity for judges to introduce a                
certain level of flexibility will also contribute towards ensuring that legitimate expectations of involved              
parties are achieved - particularly where the construction of the words within a statute gives rise to                 
considerable ambiguity.  
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The Evolution of Common Law: Revisiting Posner, Hayek & the Economic 
Analysis of Law 
 
Marianne Ojo  1
 
 
 
A Introduction 
 
Flexibility is certainly a crucial and vital element in all evolutionary processes, and as highlighted by 
Zywicki and Sanders: 
 
“Preservation of legitimate expectations often will be best furthered, not by adherence to precedence,              
but by a prudent and thoughtful updating of rules to adapt to changing needs and expectations. In                 
particular, because legal rules are just one element of the set of rules and practices that guide individual                  
behavior in society, changes in non-legal rules may also affect legal rules such that in order to best                  
preserve expectations and predictability about others’ actions, it will become necessary to amend some              
legal rules to better cohere with changing legal and non-legal rules. 
The objective is to increase social coordination such that individuals will have maximum freedom to act                
on local information as it arises. Interpersonal coordination, not aggregate economic efficiency, should             
be the overarching goal of the legal system.”  2
 
Hence the need for a reasonable balance between certainty and flexibility in the judicial process is also                 
evident. To what extent should certainty and rigidity in the process be sustained in order to preserve the                  
legitimate expectations of those parties involved? Moreover, it is also reflected that “the thoughtful              
updating of rules” as a means of adapting to changing needs and expectations is necessary in the goals                  
of preserving legitimate expectations. 
 
The aim of the ensuing section is to highlight the importance of the purposive application of rules in the                   
“updating” process. Such a goal will be facilitated by way of reference to the rules of statutory                 
interpretation. 
 
 
 
1  Professor, Faculty of Commerce and Administration, North-West University, South Africa  
 Email: marianneojo@hotmail.com 
2 TJ Zywicki and AB Sanders, “Posner, Hayek & the Economic Analysis of Law” Iowa Law Review Volume 93 No 
2,pp 559-603 February 2008, George Mason University Law and Economics Research Paper Series 
 
B “The Thoughtful Updating of Rules”: Rules of Statutory Interpretation 
 
The purposive intent of rules and the legislator constitutes a fundamental characteristic of the common               
law system. In illustrating the increased role of judges, by not only adhering to the legislator or                 
legislation, and the growing importance of interpreting rules with intent, the application of rules of               
statutory interpretation and the evolution of such rules will be elaborated on: 
 
 
The Literal Rule of Statutory Interpretation 
 
This usually constitutes the basic, starting point in construing a piece of legislation. Under this rule,                
judges are required to interpret statutes and legislation according to their ordinary, natural and dictionary               
meaning even if the outcome of such an interpretation may generate absurd or ridiculous results. Judges’                
roles are considerably limited and restricted under this rule and may be regarded as being more passive                 
when compared to their roles under the other methods of statutory interpretation. Whilst certainty              
appears to be an advantage of complying with this rule, such advantageous attributes must be weighed                
against the results which are obtained where absurd outcomes are generated and the legitimate              
expectations of parties involved are effectively not met.  
 
 
For this purpose, the golden rule constitutes the next resort where absurd results need to be mitigated. 
 
 
 
The Golden Rule of Statutory Interpretation 
 
Under this rule, judges are not only required to give effect to the literal meaning and application of the                   
rule, but should also do so with the aim and purpose of avoiding an absurd result. The golden rule is                    
namely, thus: 
 
“The golden rule is that the words of a statute must prima facie be given their ordinary                 
meaning.” 
 
- Viscount Simon (Nokes v Doncaster Amalgamated Collieries)  3
 
 
3  [1940] A.C 1014 at page 1022 
 
The Mischief Rule of Statutory Interpretation 
 
The mischief rule represents a much narrower application of the golden rule - narrower in the sense of                  
its greater focus on the intent of the legislator. Its application is considered necessary where a statute is                  
considered to have been introduced as a means of remedying or rectifying a defect or problem (the                 
mischief) in the common law.  
 
An extension of the application of the mischief rule is embodied in the fourth and final rule of statutory                   
interpretation being considered under this heading: namely, the purposive rule or the Rule in Heydon’s               
Case. 
 
 
The Purposive Rule or The Rule in Heydon’s Case 
 
The purposive rule or the rule in Heydon’s case, has at its core purpose, the discovery of the intent of                    
Parliament or the legislator, namely, 
 
What purpose was the statute enacted to rectify - for which the common law had a defect or needed to                    
be rectified? 
 
 
From the above-mentioned rules an evolvement of the role of judges is demonstrated - both in respect                 
of a greater role given to judges to interpret according to the intent of the legislator, and also in respect                    
of analytic reasoning and balancing. 
 
It is quite understandable as regards why Hayek and Posner’s backgrounds have considerably             
impacted their perspectives of the role of judges.  
 
 
According to Zywicki and Sanders,  4
 
“Posner conceives law to be a series of disparate rules and as purposive. He believes that a judge                  
should examine an individual rule and come to a conclusion about whether the rule is the most efficient                  
available,” whilst Hayek is considered to “conceive law as a purpose independent set of legal rules                
bound within a large social order.” 
 
4  TJ Zywicki and AB Sanders, “Posner, Hayek & the Economic Analysis of Law” Iowa Law Review Volume 93 No 2, 
page 559 
 
These views will now be examined to a broader context under a landmark ruling which has not only                  
contributed to judges’ abilities to introduce aids as a means of interpreting statutes to a more effective                 
extent, but also demonstrates the interdependency of rules - from one social order to the next. 
 
 
C Pepper v Hart : The Mischief Rule and the Inclusion of Aids (Parliamentary Privileged              
Information) as a Means to Statutory Interpretation 
 
 
Pepper v Hart represented a landmark ruling in the sense that it was the first time whereby the use of                    5
privileged parliamentary debates, information and records (Hansard) were permitted as admissible aids            
to statutory interpretation. The case involved the valuation of employee benefits for income tax purposes               
- given the ambiguous wordings of the statute involved. 
  
The following issues were raised in the case: 
 
1) Should existing rule prohibiting any reference to Parliamentary material (Hansard) in construing            
legislation be relaxed, and if so, to what extent? 
 
2) If so, does the case fall within the category of cases where reference to Parliamentary               
proceedings should be permitted? 
 
3) If reference to Parliamentary proceedings is permissible, what is the true construction of the              
statutory provisions? 
 
4) If reference to Parliamentary proceedings is not permissible, what is the true construction of the               
statutory provisions? 
 
As per Lord Browne-Wilkinson: 
 
“Reference to Parliamentary material should be permitted as an aid to the construction of legislation               
which is ambiguous or obscure, or the literal meaning of which leads to an absurdity. Even in such cases,                   
references in court to Parliamentary material should only be permitted where such material clearly              
discloses the mischief aimed at or the legislative intention lying behind the ambiguous or obscure words.”               
 6
5 [1992] 3 WLR 1032, [1993] 1 All ER 42, HL (E) 
6 See ibid, also see S C Styles, “The Rule of Parliament: Statutory Interpretation After Pepper v Hart”  Oxford Journal 
of Legal Studies Vol 14 No 1 ( Spring 1994) pp 151-158 Oxford University Press 
 
 
Section 63 of the 1976 Finance Act constituted the central piece of legislation in the case. It is obvious                   
that in such cases - not just those cases involving contentious attributions to the construction of the piece                  
of legislation, but those whose scope may lie beyond the scope and principal expertise of the judge, aids                  
to statutory interpretation may be justified where such aids are vital to efficient allocation of resources,                
as well as generating outcomes which could be considered to be reasonably efficient within the ambit of                 
legitimate expectations of the parties involved. 
 
Should judicial decisions be criticised for generating more efficient and purposive outcomes -             
particularly where the legislative source being referred to (regardless of whether such a source is               
privileged information), has not been altered in any sense, but has simply served as a means of shedding                  
more light, providing more information, and giving purpose and meaning (or more meaning) to the               
legislation at hand? 
 
 
D `Conclusion 
 
“If we can agree that the economic problem of society is mainly one of rapid adaptation to changes in                   
the particular circumstances of time and place, it would seem to follow that the ultimate decisions must                 
be left to the people who are familiar with these circumstances, who know directly of the relevant                 
changes and of the resources immediately available to meet them. 
 
We need decentralization because only thus can we ensure that the knowledge of the particular               
circumstances of time and place will be promptly used.”  7
 
 
Judges should certainly not make and unmake the law in certain cases - the supremacy of Parliament                 
should be adhered to. Judge made law, namely common law, however constitutes an exception where               
the principle of stare decisis cannot hold in a world which is constantly changing and where those                 
changes need to be incorporated into decisions if such decisions are to generate meaningful results. 
 
Prices, for example, constitute examples of vital information which need to be updated constantly if               
wages which were earned centuries ago, are to have meaningful and reasonable importance and values               
in modern day valuation and measurements. The rise of macroeconomics has certainly played a part in                
impacting and interpreting the values attributed to information and macro indicators. Markets will             
7 F A Hayek, “The Use of Knowledge in Society” The American Economic Review, Vol. 35, No. 4. (Sep., 1945), pp. 
519-530 
http://www.jstor.org/discover/10.2307/1809376?uid=3739920&uid=2&uid=4&uid=3739256&sid=21104299293711 
definitely evolve and adequate rules are needed to regulate the markets. This is very evident given the                 
fact that market failures, namely information asymmetries exist, and also the fact that the Efficient               
Markets Hypothesis does not hold in its entirety. Decentralization, hence constitutes a means of not only                
mitigating information asymmetries, but also ensuring that efficient maximisation of resource utilisation            
and allocation, takes place. 
 
Hence the decentralisation of powers and information, in this case, from the executive and legislature to                
the judiciary, should be viewed positively as a means of addressing and mitigating informational              
asymmetries resulting from ambiguous, confusing and misleading words within a statute and also             
resulting in more efficient allocation of resources, and awarding of damages to the parties involved. 
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